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In 1963, the United States Supreme Court held in
Brady v. Maryland “that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.”1 This obligation applies
to both the guilt and sentencing stages
of trial, and the prosecutor’s duty to turn over
exculpatory evidence is triggered even if the
defense does not request it.2 This firmly established
principle was reiterated and reinforced
again in the 1990s in Kyles v. Whitley, wherein the
Court stated that a defendant is entitled to 
a new trial or sentencing proceeding if there is a
reasonable probability that the disclosure of the
suppressed evidence would have produced a
different result.3
Yet despite these long recognized constitutional
responsibilities, some prosecutors fail to honor
Brady. As Kyles v. Whitley seems to suggest, the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office when it
was under the stewardship of District Attorney
Harry Connick fell short of meeting its duty under
Brady.4 Over the past two years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has confronted two more cases dealing with
failures of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s
Office to live up to its Brady obligations. Last term
the Court considered the case of Connick v.
Thompson5. John Thompson was prosecuted,
convicted and sentenced to death in Orleans
Parish, Louisiana for the murder of New Orleans
businessman Raymond Liuzza, Jr. The killing was
observed by a witness who provided a clear
description of the perpetrator: an African
American male, six feet tall, with closely cropped
hair.6
A few weeks earlier an armed robbery had
occurred. During the scuffle, the perpetrator’s
blood soiled the pants of one of the victims. A
swatch of clothing with the perpetrator’s blood
was sent for analysis to the New Orleans Police
lab. Following the murder, an informant
approached the family and offered to provide
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information in exchange for money. This
conversation was recorded. The snitch claimed to
be able to provide another witness to the murder,
and the name of the murderer.  Based on the
snitch’s information, John Thompson was arrested
for the Liuzza murder. When Thompson’s
photograph appeared in the local media following
his arrest, families of the juvenile victims of the
armed robbery told authorities that Thompson was
the robber.7
Thompson was tried and convicted first on the
armed robbery charge. He was sentenced to 49
years without the possibility of parole. At his
murder trial, Thompson chose not to testify on his
own behalf because the armed robbery conviction
would have been used to impeach his credibility
and show that he had a history of violence.
Thompson was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death.
Several weeks before Thompson’s May 1999
execution date, defense investigators discovered
that prosecutors failed to hand over exculpatory
evidence which would have cleared Thompson of
the armed robbery charge. Two days before the
armed robbery trial, prosecutors received the
results of the blood tests from the crime lab. The
armed robber whose blood stained the pants of
one of the victims was blood Type B. Thompson’s
blood is Type O. Although the defense had
specifically requested that the prosecutors hand
over “all scientific test results,” the District
Attorney’s Office intentionally withheld the crime
lab report. Worse, when prosecutors moved the
evidence from the police property room and
checked the evidence into the court property
room for trial, the blood-stained swatch of cloth
disappeared.8
Having wrongfully convicted Thompson of armed
robbery, the prosecutors proceeded with the
murder trial. Again the prosecution failed to hand
over powerfully exculpatory evidence, including
the original eyewitness’ description of the
murderer. Thompson was not six feet tall with
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close cropped hair. He stood five feet eight inches,
and wore his hair in a large Afro at the time of the
murder. Prosecutors also failed to hand over the
audio tape of their informant, which showed that
he was paid for his information. And what of the
additional witness the informant led the police to?
He became the prosecution’s key witness – a six
foot tall African American nicknamed Kojak
because of his close cropped hair.9
In 1994, five years prior to Thompson’s execution
date, Gerry Deegan, one of his prosecutors,
contracted terminal cancer.  As Deegan lay dying
of cancer, he confessed to another former
prosecutor that he had withheld the blood
evidence. Making matters worse, the confession
remained secret for the next five years while
Thompson awaited execution on death row. The
evidence only came to light after Thompson’s
investigator found an old microfiche of the lab
results.10
The Louisiana Court of Appeals vacated both of
Thompson’s convictions. Specifically, the court
held that the armed robbery conviction, which
was tainted by the Brady violation,
unconstitutionally deprived Thompson of his right
to testify in his murder case. Louisiana decided to
drop the armed robbery charges and retry
Thompson for murder. On retrial, it took the jury
35 minutes to acquit Thompson.11
Because of the Brady violations and the resulting
wrongful convictions, Thompson endured eighteen
years in prison; he spent fourteen of those
eighteen years on death row. He faced seven
different execution dates.
After his exonerations, Thompson filed a federal
civil rights law suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
against Harry Connick, Sr., the District Attorney
for Orleans Parish. A jury awarded Thompson $14
million and the District Attorney appealed the
judgment. It was this issue – whether Thompson
was entitled to the jury award in the civil rights
suit – that was before the U.S. Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Connick. In a five-to-four decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided that Thompson was
not entitled to the damage award, despite the
intentional and wrongful Brady violation, because
Thompson did not show that the District Attorney
engaged in a pattern of deliberate indifference in
his failure to train his Assistant District Attorneys
with respect to their Brady obligations.12
The four dissenters in Thompson, however, detailed
the egregious Brady violations that they believed
supported the damage award. According to these
justices, the District Attorney and his office
“misperceived Brady‘s compass,”13 and the record
showed that four prosecutors over a period of
nearly twenty years repeatedly failed to turn over
exculpatory evidence.14 Justice Ginsburg in her
dissent stated: 
“What happened here . . . was no momentary
oversight, no single incident of a lone
officer’s misconduct. Instead, the evidence
demonstrated that misperception and
disregard of Brady‘s disclosure requirements
were pervasive in Orleans Parish. That
evidence, I would hold, established
persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct
for which the District Attorney’s Office bears
responsibility under [the federal civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”15
This term, the Court once again confronts Brady
violations committed by the Orleans Parish
District Attorney’s Office when it was headed by
District Attorney Connick. In Smith v. Cain, the
Court must determine whether the prosecutors’
violation of Brady entitles Juan Smith to a new
trial.16 The state’s case hinged on the testimony of
an eyewitness who placed Smith at the crime scene
and identified Smith as the shooter.17 However, the
prosecutor failed to turn over multiple prior
inconsistent statements by this eyewitness as well
as statements by other witnesses that raised
considerable questions about the credibility of the
eyewitness and the reliability of his identification.
The Court heard oral arguments in Smith’s case on
Tuesday, November 8, 2011. The Court’s
questioning of Donna Andrieu, the Assistant
District Attorney representing the state, was
pointed, critical and relentless. Most of the
justices appeared to find the actions of the District
Attorney deeply troubling. For example, Justice
Ginsburg seemed astounded that the prosecution
would even argue that the eyewitness’
inconsistent statements were not material.18
Likewise, Justice Kennedy told the assistant
prosecutor, “you say that’s immaterial. I find that
incredible.”19 And Chief Justice Roberts bluntly
pointed out “if you were the defense lawyer you
really would like to have that statement where he
said: I couldn’t identify them.”20 Even Justice Scalia
thought the evidence ought to have been turned
over; his chief concern was whether the error rose
to a level which would entitle Smith to relief. Most
of the other justices asked questions that seemed
to indicate that not only did they find the
evidence material but also they believed there was
a reasonable probability that the suppression of
the evidence affected the outcome of the case.
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Consider this exchange between the Assistant
District Attorney and Justice Kagan:
JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Andrieu, did your office
ever just consider confessing error in this
case?
MS. ANDRIEU: I’m sorry?
JUSTICE KAGAN: Did your office ever consider
just consider confessing error in this case?
You’ve had a bunch a time to think about it.
Do you know? We took cert. a while ago. I’m
just wondering whether you’ve ever
considered confessing error.21
Ms. Andrieu did not appear willing to confess error
at this time. The Court, however, will be making its
judgment on the District Attorneys’ conduct
sometime in the next six or seven months.
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1 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
2 See United States v Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
3 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995). Defendant Kyles was
prosecuted in Orleans Parish, Louisiana. 
4 See http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=131456. 
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